Resource flexibility, arguably among the most celebrated operational concepts, is known to provide firms facing demand uncertainty with such benefits as risk pooling, revenue-maximization optionality, and operational hedging. In this article we show that resource flexibility mitigates censoring of sales data, and thereby facilitates learning the true demand under a variety of practical settings, demand distributions, and model parameters. This suggests that extant models, which view flexibility only as the ability to act ex post, could be underestimating its true value when learning the demand is desirable, for example, when it enables managers to make better-informed decisions ex ante.
Introduction
Flexibility is often quoted as one of the key competitive priorities of a firm together with cost, quality, and speed [Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984] . Among its many forms, arguably the most celebrated is resource flexibility, exemplified by the legendary success stories of Toyota, Benetton, or HP among many others [Sodhi and Tang, 2012] . Not surprisingly, resource flexibility has also played a prominent role in the operations literature, spanning four decades of research going back to the early work of Eppen [1979] on stock centralization. The well-known and extensively studied benefits of resource flexibility include the reduction of mismatch between supply and demand through risk pooling [Jordan and Graves, 1995] , the option to allocate resources to the most profitable use [Van Mieghem, 1998 ], and the ability to serve as an operational hedge [Van Mieghem, 2007] .
Thanks to all these benefits, flexibility is often defined as the "ability to react" to uncertain demand realization [Golden and Powell, 2000] .
Herein, we theorize that resource flexibility carries an important benefit that has been overlooked in the academic literature so far. Namely, we examine whether resource flexibility can help firms to learn about the underlying uncertainty. In practice, true demand information is rarely observable and firms usually infer it from censored sales data. The research question that we address in this paper is whether flexibility can mitigate censoring and thereby facilitate learning.
Answering this question in the affirmative has the potential to change the way operations managers think about flexibility. The ability to learn demand information is an invaluable operational capability in today's e-commerce-dominated business landscape, enabling firms to make better assortment, capacity, and pricing decisions, among others. If, and to the extent that, it facilitated learning, flexibility would inherit all these benefits. In other words, besides the ability to react ex post, flexibility would enhance firms' ability to learn about the underlying uncertainty and thereby to potentially make better-informed decisions ex ante. This would also suggest that firms contemplating investing in flexibility, either by converting a legacy non-flexible system or building a flexible system from scratch, may be underestimating its true value by accounting merely for its "reactive" abilities.
To address this research question, we compare learning between flexible and non-flexible operating systems within the following parsimonious model. There are two uncertain demand streams for two products or services, which are fulfilled using pre-installed resource capacities. We consider two alternative systems: a non-flexible one, in which each demand requires a dedicated resource, and a flexible one, in which both demands can be fulfilled using a single flexible resource. We then compare the two systems' ability to learn, which we measure as the probability of observing actual demand or, equivalently, of averting censoring.
In practice different circumstances may lead firms to choose different system capacities. For example, a firm may already have non-flexible resources in place and be presented with an opportunity to convert them to flexible ones, or it may be building a new system from scratch and have the option to choose the system capacity optimally, whether it is flexible or non-flexible. As a result, there is no universal "fair comparison" between the two systems. To capture to the largest extent the different settings, and to obtain robust and generalizable findings, we compare learning in the two systems under three alternative scenarios:
(i) Equal capacities. The flexible system's resource capacity equals the sum of dedicated capacities of the non-flexible system. This could be relevant, for example, when pre-installed dedicated resources can be converted to flexible resources at a fixed cost (and zero, or negligible variable cost).
(ii) Equal costs. The unit capacity cost of the flexible resource equals the unit capacity cost of the dedicated resources. This could be relevant, for example, when both systems are built from scratch and, compared to dedicated, flexible capacity has similar variable cost, but higher fixed cost.
(iii) Equal profits. The flexible resource unit capacity cost is such that the two systems yield equal expected profits, when capacities are chosen optimally. 1 This would be relevant, for example, when both systems are built from scratch and, compared to dedicated capacity, flexible capacity has the same fixed cost, but a higher variable cost. Equating expected profits then implicitly defines the maximum unit cost of flexible capacity at which the firm should adopt flexibility.
Whether flexibility enhances learning or not is far from obvious. Consider the first scenario with equal total capacities. On the one hand, one could argue that flexibility helps with learning because it leads to lower total lost sales, and losing sales is tantamount to censoring. On the other hand, the flexible system also leads to lower total unused capacity. So, one could make a counterargument that flexibility limits learning, since observing the actual demand is equivalent to ending up with some unused capacity. Furthermore, censoring depends critically on the total capacity. When this capacity is chosen optimally under the second and third scenarios, the flexible system may justify higher or lower total capacity, depending on the setting and the parameters.
Nevertheless, our analysis reveals that under a wide variety of demand distributions and plausible parameter values, resource flexibility improves learning in each of the three settings. We find flexibility to limit learning only in the case of products/services that have vastly different economic parameters, or when their demand characteristics exhibit certain asymmetries. In the special but important case of products with a relatively high margin, we find flexibility to enhance learning regardless of demand characteristics, unless the economic parameters of the products are vastly different. (Note that, in practice, products that can be produced using the same flexible resource must be inherently similar to some degree, so they are unlikely to have vastly different economic parameters.)
As many firms strive to redesign their supply chains from cost-efficient to responsive, resource flexibility is recognized as a key enabler of responding to fast-changing market conditions. Our findings imply that resource flexibility can be also an important enabler of learning the changes in market conditions more efficiently, which could provide an invaluable competitive advantage. That is, when learning matters, the value of flexibility could be higher than suggested by the existing literature, and so would be the cost threshold for which a firm should adopt a flexible system, 1 Unless stated otherwise, we use the term "optimal" with respect to maximizing the expected profit.
whether that cost is primarily fixed or variable.
Our findings open up several exciting research opportunities that could extend seminal works on operating flexibility, such as the ones by Fine and Freund [1990] , Jordan and Graves [1995] , and Van Mieghem [1998] . We elaborate on some of these opportunities in Section 4.
Related Literature
Our paper contributes primarily to the flexibility literature, which has thus far identified at least three distinct benefits of resource flexibility. The first one is the reduction of the mismatch between supply and demand through risk-pooling, and it can be captured through many different strategies including stock centralization [Eppen, 1979 , Schwarz, 1989 , investing in flexible production capacity [Chod and Rudi, 2005 , Fine and Freund, 1990 , Jordan and Graves, 1995 , Netessine et al., 2002 , Van Mieghem, 1998 ], or postponement of product differentiation [Lee and Tang, 1997, Swaminathan and Tayur, 1998 ]. Second, resource flexibility often provides the real option to allocate the flexible resource to the most profitable use, e.g., the high-margin product [Van Mieghem, 1998 ], or in a global setting, the market with a favorable exchange rate [Ding et al., 2007, Huchzermeier and Cohen, 1996] . Finally, resource flexibility can be sometimes used as an operational hedge to mitigate profit variability [Chod et al., 2010 , Ding et al., 2007 , Van Mieghem, 2007 . We are not aware of any papers that would study the effect of resource flexibility on learning. Our contribution to the flexibility literature is to identify this effect, and to suggest that this literature undervalues true benefits of resource flexibility when learning is taken into consideration.
Our work is also novel within the literature on learning with censored demand data. There are two distinct, and complementary, strands in this literature: (i) the parametric approach, applied to both perishable [Besbes et al., 2017 , Ding et al., 2002 , Harpaz et al., 1982 , Jain et al., 2015 , Lariviere and Porteus, 1999 , Lu et al., 2008 , Mersereau, 2015 and nonperishable products [Bensoussan and Guo, 2015 , Bisi et al., 2011 , Chen, 2010 , Chen and Plambeck, 2008 ; (ii) the nonparametric approach, either establishing the asymptotic convergence to the optimal decision [Burnetas and Smith, 2000 , Godfrey and Powell, 2001 , Huh et al., 2011 , Kunnumkal and Topaloglu, 2008 , Maglaras and Eren, 2015 , Powell et al., 2004 , van Ryzin and McGill, 2000 , or minimizing the regret [Besbes and Muharremoglu, 2013 , Huh and Rusmevichientong, 2009 , Lugosi et al., 2017 , Shi et al., 2016 .
A common feature of the above works is that the production/procurement capabilities of the firm are exogenous, so no connection is drawn between a firm's ability to learn through censored data and its flexibility, or the lack thereof.
Model
We consider a profit-maximizing firm that markets two products or services, possibly two versions of the same product customized for two different markets. 2 We henceforth refer to them simply as products, and index them by i ∈ {1, 2}. Demand for product i is a continuous random variable, denoted by D i , and F i is its marginal c.d.f. The sale of product i generates unit revenue p i , and p 1 ≥ p 2 without loss of generality.
Sales are constrained by the capacity of a critical resource, such as finished product inventory, WIP, machinery, or workforce, that has to be determined before demand is known. We consider two production systems:
Non-flexible system (N ) In our benchmark, non-flexible system, each product requires a productspecific resource, whose capacity, denoted as Q i for product i, is built at a constant marginal cost unit c. The profit margin of product i is then p i − c in this system. 3 Note that assuming equal marginal cost for both products simplifies exposition without loss of generality; varying unit revenues enables us to consider any combination of the all important margins.
The sales of product i are
and the firm chooses capacities of the two resources, Q, so as to maximize expected profit
LetQ = arg max Q π N be the vector of optimal non-flexible capacity levels, which are standard newsvendor solutions.
Flexible system (F ) In the flexible system, the firm can satisfy both demands using a single flexible resource, which could be inventory of undifferentiated WIP, flexible machinery, or crosstrained workforce. The capacity of the flexible resource, denoted as Q F , is built at a constant marginal cost c F . The margin of product i is then p i − c F in this system.
We assume that demand for the more-profitable product 1 is realized first, which could be the result of the firm's price skimming strategy, for example, whereby the firm first markets the high-end version of the product, or first launches the product in the market that is less price-sensitive.
Consequently, it is optimal to make the entire flexible capacity available to satisfying product 1's demand. 4 The sales of two products are thus
and the expected profit is
In general, the flexible and non-flexible systems can have different capacity costs, different capacity levels, and can lead to different expected profits. As discussed earlier, we compare the two systems under three alternative scenarios, which differ in the parameters of the two systems that we make equal for "fair comparison." Not to overload notation, we denote the flexible capacity in each scenario asQ F even though its value is scenario-specific.
(i) Equal capacities. In this scenario, we assume that the capacity of the flexible resource equals the total capacity of the non-flexible resources, i.e.,
(ii) Equal costs. Here, we assume that flexible capacity is chosen optimally, and it has the same marginal cost as each non-flexible capacity, i.e.,
(iii) Equal profits. Finally, we assume that flexible capacity is chosen optimally, and its marginal cost is such that the two systems yield the same expected profit, i.e.,
Our comparison of the two systems will focus on their demand learning capabilities, in particular, on their ability to mitigate censoring. We define learning in each system as the number of product demands that the firm observes uncensored, i.e.,
and expected learning, or learning capability, of each system as
For tractability, we focus on the following two families of demand distributions: stable distributions and uniform distributions. Stable distributions represent a broad family that subsumes many distributions frequently used by academics and practitioners, such as Gaussian, Cauchy, and Lévy, which can be tailored in terms of their mean, scale, skewness, and tail asymptotics. Importantly, the stable class includes both light-tailed and heavy-tailed distributions, capturing fundamentally different demand variability regimes; for further discussion and empirical evidence of heavy-tailed demand uncertainty see Bimpikis and Markakis [2016] . We restrict attention to symmetric stable distributions that have a well defined mean, which we also assume to be high enough so that the probability of negative demand is negligible, i.e., F i (0) ≈ 0, i = 1, 2. Uniform distributions are also important from the perspective of learning, having the "least informative" priors in the sense that all demand realizations in the support are equally likely.
Results
Our aim is to compare the learning capabilities of the flexible and non-flexible systems in each of the three scenarios of interest. We also examine how the comparison depends on demand characteristics (means, standard deviations, and correlation) and economic characteristics (profit margins) of the two products.
Our analysis for each scenario proceeds as follows. First, we study the "symmetric" case in which demands are i.i.d. and product characteristics are equal. Studying the symmetric case is already of practical interest, given that products that can be produced using the same flexible resources are often inherently similar to each other (e.g., cellphones with GSM or CDMA antennas).
Furthermore, studying the symmetric case enables us to establish baseline results that prove useful in the second step of the analysis, in which we explore the effect of each product characteristic on the comparison of the learning capabilities of the two systems. In §3.4, we perform a robustness check wherein learning is accounted for in the firm's objective, and derive findings that further back our main result. Before we proceed to formally stating our findings, we provide some intuition for the main result. Not surprisingly, flexibility usually improves learning about the first demand stream, i.e.,
because the total capacity in the flexible system is typically at least as high as the capacity dedicated to product 1 in the non-flexible system. 5 Interestingly, in many salient scenarios, flexibility also facilitates learning about the second demand stream, i.e.,
For example, in the case of symmetric margins and equal costs scenario, both sides of (12) are equal to the same newsvendor fractile. Furthermore, in the case of symmetric product parameters and equal capacities scenario, condition (12) becomes
which, under a Gaussian demand distribution, holds true as long as capacity exceeds mean demand, as is the case for high-margin products.
In fact, the latter line of reasoning applies more generally: for products with relatively high margins such that p i − c ≥ c, the dedicated system has capacitiesQ i ≥ µ i , i = 1, 2, which suggests that the total capacity of the flexible systemQ F is also large relative to the mean demands. At the same time, the pooling effect reduces the coefficient of variation of D 1 + D 2 . The two arguments combined suggest that condition (12) holds. Hence, in the case of high-margin products, flexibility facilitates learning in all three scenarios, irrespective of the precise demand characteristics.
It turns out that flexibility facilitates learning in many more, but not all, cases. Next we provide formal statements for each of the three scenarios. All proofs are relegated to Appendix A.
Equal capacities
We begin with the "symmetric" case. 
Proposition 1(a
We next examine the effect of demand correlation and asymmetry in demand/economic characteristics of the two products. (ii) even if demand means differ and µ 2 ≥ µ 1 − ∆µ, for some ∆µ > 0.
Proposition 1(b). Assume that the demands follow a bivariate normal distribution with means
(iii) even if demand standard deviations differ and σ 2 ≤λ σ 1 , for someλ > 1.
While some of the findings of this proposition are quite intuitive, others are somewhat surprising.
In particular, for products with relatively low margins, flexibility may not facilitate learning when the demands are strongly anticorrelated, even though negative correlation is known to enhance the pooling effect that flexibility attempts to capitalize on. Furthermore, flexibility may not facilitate learning when the mean demand for the least profitable product is small, even though this demand is satisfied last, through left-over capacity. Before we proceed further, let us provide some intuition.
In cases where the margins are low, and henceQ i < µ i , i = 1, 2, the flexible system typically learns better the demand for the more profitable product, but not the demand for the less profitable one.
Thus, whether flexibility facilitates learning overall, depends on the comparison between
This explains why the results in the case of low margins are sensitive to the precise demand characteristics. Now, if the demands are strongly anticorrelated, then their sum tends to be close to the mean, and P D 1 + D 2 ≤Q F is small. Similarly, if the mean demand for the less profitable product is small, then the total capacity of the flexible system is low, which, again, suggests that P D 1 +D 2 ≤Q F is could be small. In both cases, the flexible system does not learn the demand for the less profitable product as well as the dedicated one, and the relative disadvantage, on average, outweighs the benefit of learning better the other demand.
We conclude by showing that for products with relatively high margins, the effects of correlation and asymmetry in demand/economic characteristics we found in our previous result fade, and the learning capabilities of flexible system always dominate. This is yet another surprising finding, the intuition behind which we have provided already: the reduction in demand variability due to the pooling effect (irrespective of the exact characteristics of the demands), combined with the large capacity due to the high margins, suffice for the flexible system to learn both demands better.
Proposition 1(c). Consider the setting in Proposition 1(b) and further assume that
Then, we can selectρ = −1, ∆µ → ∞, andλ → ∞ and the results continue to hold.
Note that forρ = −1, ∆µ → ∞, andλ → ∞ the inequalities in Proposition 1(b)'s statements (i) − (iii) are trivially satisfied, and L F ≥ L N for any correlation or asymmetry in demand parameters.
Equal costs
In the scenario of equal costs, flexibility facilitates learning regardless of demand correlation or product characteristics.
Proposition 2. The expected learning in the flexible system is greater than in the non-flexible one:
As a technical remark, for this result we need not limit ourselves to any demand distributional assumptions, as long as the demands follow a continuous joint distribution on R 2 + .
Equal profits
For this scenario, we derive a mix of analytical and numerical results.
Proposition 3(a). Assume that the demands are independent and distributed identically according
to a uniform distribution, and that the products have the same margin, i.e., p 1 = p 2 . Then, the expected learning in the flexible system is greater than in the non-flexible one, i.e.,
In terms of the effect of different demand/economic characteristics of the two products, we have the following result:
Proposition 3(b). Assume that the demands are independent and uniformly distributed with means
µ and standard deviations σ. Assume that µ 1 = µ 2 , σ 1 = σ 2 , and that the products have the same margin, i.e., p 1 = p 2 . Then, the expected learning in the flexible system is greater than in the
(ii) even if demand standard deviations differ and σ 2 ≤λσ 1 , for someλ > 1.
(iii) even if their margins differ and p
We conclude by showing that when underage is costlier than overage, the effect of different demand characteristics we found in our previous result fades.
Proposition 3(c). Consider the setting in Proposition 3(b) and further assume that
p i − c ≥ c.
Then, we can selectλ → ∞ and the results continue to hold.
Notably, the effect of different economic characteristics persists in this case, so that the learning capabilities of flexible resources dominate in this scenario only if margins do not differ by too much,
We also compared L F and L N assuming normally distributed demands in an extensive numerical study whose details are provided in Appendix B. In summary, we compared L F and L N while varying the fractile (
demand µ 2 /µ 1 , asymmetry in demand variability σ 2 /σ 1 , asymmetry in unit revenues p 2 /p 1 , and various combinations thereof. We found that flexibility improves learning as long as the economic characteristics of the two products are not vastly different. Namely, the only instances in which
Robustness Check: Objective with Learning Considerations
We have thus far assumed that the firm's objective is to maximize expected profit, and showed that flexibility typically enhances learning. As a robustness check, we show below that our results persist when learning is explicitly included in the firm's objective along with profit. In particular,
we now assume that the firm maximizes
when using system X ∈ {N, F }. The parameter γ ≥ 0 represents the expected monetary reward for each uncensored demand observation. Such a reward captures the "value of demand information"
and is highly context-specific. For example, it could correspond to the profit increase resulting from making better-informed pricing, assortment, or capacity decisions in future periods.
Recall that under the flexible design, in addition to the capacity level, the firm also chooses the ex post capacity allocation between the two products. Under profit maximization, the allocation decision is trivial: because the second product has a lower unit revenue and its demand is realized later, it is optimal to make the entire flexible capacity available to satisfy the first demand stream.
Under the new objective in (13), the allocation decision is more subtle. Let α be the fraction of flexible capacity that the firm reserves to serve exclusively the second demand stream, in which
The optimal α is chosen so as to optimize (13).
To avoid degenerate cases, we limit our analysis to values of γ that are not too large. In particular, as γ grows, so does the optimal dedicated capacityQ i under the non-flexible system.
If that optimal capacity becomes so large that no stock-outs occur under the non-flexible system almost surely, i.e., P D i ≤Q i = 1, then clearly there is no point in considering flexible resources to start with. (This remains true even in the absence of learning considerations, if the products' profit margins are too large.) For tractability, we focus here on the symmetric case and uniform demand distributions. 6
When expected learning has an explicit monetary value that the firm trades off against profit,
6 Under non-uniform demand distributions, the objective (13) need not be concave, nor unimodal.
comparing it in isolation under the two systems, as we have done thus far, no longer represents a meaningful comparison. Indeed, one needs to look at the aggregate objective π X + γL X . Therefore, we consider the "equal costs" and "equal profits" scenarios adjusted as follows. We do not consider the "equal capacities" scenario here because under it, the value of flexible capacity c F is undefined, F ) ) be the expected profit and learning when optimal actions are taken with respect to (13) under the non-flexible system (the flexible system with the unit flexible capacity cost of c F ).
For the "equal costs" scenario, assume again that c F = c. Clearly, the flexible system would always yield a higher objective value. However, we show that, when learning is valued, its advantage over the non-flexible system is higher, and so is the firm's preference for flexible resources.
Proposition 4(a). Assume that the demands are independent and uniformly distributed on [x, x+1],
and that the products have the same margin, i.e., p 1 = p 2 . Further assume that γ is such that
For the "equal profits" scenario, assume that the unit cost of flexible capacity, denoted here with c F (γ) to highlight the dependence on how much learning is "valued at," is such that the two systems achieve the same objective, i.e.,
This value of the cost c F (γ) bears an intuitive interpretation: it is the maximum cost the firm is willing to pay for flexible capacity. Therefore, if c F (γ) ≥ c F (0) were true, a firm that cares about learning would be willing to pay more for flexibility than a firm that does not.
Proposition 4(b). Assume that the demands are independent and uniformly distributed on [x, x+1],
Our results reinforce the key message of our paper that flexibility becomes more valuable when learning is accounted for.
Insights and Future Research
In this paper we demonstrate that resource flexibility tends to facilitate learning by mitigating censoring. So doing, we identify a novel and important benefit of resource flexibility, which appears to be robust under a broad class of design scenarios that can arise in practice.
Our work has the potential to change the way operations managers think about flexibility:
beyond the mere ability to hedge against uncertainty, flexibility helps to reduce it, and therefore could enable firms to make better-informed decisions in the future. As learning capabilities often represent a competitive priority in today's rapidly changing business landscape, learning emerges as one of flexibility's distinct benefits alongside risk pooling, revenue maximization, and operational hedging. This also suggests that the true value of flexibility could be greater than suggested by the existing models, which account merely for its reactive abilities.
Our research opens up a whole new range of possible research avenues. To point out a few, it would be interesting to quantify the monetary value of the learning benefits of flexibility. To this end, one would need to explicitly model the contingent decisions that may benefit from superior demand forecasts. For example, one could examine the effect of flexibility in a multi-period inventory problem with demand forecast updating. We have seen that resource flexibility, in the form of delayed product differentiation, provides the firm with superior information regarding the demand, in one period. When demands in consecutive periods are correlated, this should lead to better demand forecasts and, thus, better inventory decisions in subsequent periods. Modeling these decisions would also allow to quantify the learning benefits of flexibility for fast-fashion retailers, like ZARA and H&M, which are alleged to learn fashion trends faster than their competitors by leveraging the frequent reordering and redesigning capabilities their flexible operating systems offer.
This line of research can also be thought as extending the seminal works of Fine and Freund [1990] and Van Mieghem [1998] : given the learning benefits of flexibility, how would the insights of these papers be affected in multiperiod settings? Similarly, it would be worthwhile to study the synergies of flexibility with operating decisions, beyond inventory or capacity management, that can benefit from more accurate demand forecasts, such as pricing, promotion, and assortment decisions.
Another interesting research direction would be to study learning benefits of process flexibility in the context of Jordan and Graves [1995] . Does limited flexibility, configured to chain products and resources together to the greatest extent possible, yields most of the learning benefits of total flexibility?
We have focused on resource flexibility, which subsumes many different forms such as employing a flexible manufacturing system, cross-training workforce, or delaying product differentiation, etc.
And what about different types of flexibility such as quick response or lowering setup costs?
Finally, one could consider alternative performance evaluation criteria beyond the expected profit, such as the regret or the competitive ratio, which would facilitate the analysis of dynamic settings with non-stationary demand. More generally, it would be interesting to consider resource planning decisions within the classical learning-and-earning frameworks.
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A. Proofs
We begin by presenting some technical lemmata that will be useful in the subsequent proofs.
Lemma 1. Q 1 ,Q 2 is the optimal solution to Eq. (2) if and only if
Proof. In deciding the capacities for the non-flexible system, the firm faces a newsvendor-type tradeoff. Hence, the optimal solution has the standard critical-quantile form. We provide a proof of this result for completeness. Fix i ∈ {1, 2} and note that
since we have assumed that D i is a continuous random variable with an atomless density. Therefore,
Note that derivative and expectation can be interchanged in this case due to Leibniz's integral rule: Consequently, a necessary condition forQ i being the maximum in Eq. (2) is:
It can be verified that
is a concave function of Q, which implies that its expectation with respect to the joint distribution of (D 1 , D 2 ), i.e., function π N , is also concave in Q. Hence, the above condition is also sufficient for the optimality ofQ.
Lemma 2.Q F is the optimal solution to Eq. (8) if and only if
Proof. Our proof strategy is similar to that of Lemma 1. In particular, by arguing in exactly the same way, we have that
Similarly, by noting that
we have
Consequently, a necessary condition forQ F being the maximum in Eq. (8) is:
It can be verified that the function
is concave in Q F , which implies that its expectation with respect to the joint distribution of (D 1 , D 2 ), i.e., function π F , is also concave in Q F . Hence, the above condition is also sufficient A2 for the optimality ofQ F .
Lemma 3. Consider a newsvendor selling at unit price p, buying at unit cost c, facing demand uniformly distributed on
, where x, U ≥ 0, with no salvage value. The optimal capacityQ to invest and associated expected profit π are given bȳ
Furthermore, if the objective is to maximize π + γL, for 0 ≤ γ ≤ c, the optimal capacityQ γ to invest and associated objective value o γ are given bȳ
(The proof of Lemma 3 is similar to the ones above and is omitted.)
Proof of Proposition 1(a)
In the scenario of equal capacities, the firm chooses the capacities for the non-flexible system so as to maximize its expected profit. The capacity in the flexible system is then determined implicitly, as the total capacity in the non-flexible one, i.e.,Q F =Q 1 +Q 2 . Moreover, in the benchmark case that we analyze here the products/services are "fully symmetric," i.e., their demands are independent and identically distributed,
= D, and they have the same margins, p 1 = p 2 = p. Together, the assumptions above imply thatQ 1 =Q 2 =Q, andQ F = 2Q.
Before we proceed to the proof of this result, let us provide some background on the class of stable distributions. In general, a stable distribution is characterized by four parameters: the stability parameter α ∈ (0, 2], the skewness parameter β ∈ [−1, 1], the scale parameter σ > 0, and the location parameter µ ∈ R. Henceforth, we denote by S α (σ, β, µ) a stable distribution with stability α, scale σ, skewness β, and location µ. The stability parameter α determines the shape of the tail of the distribution. In the special case of α = 2 we retrieve the normal distribution. In contrast, for α < 2 the distribution has infinite variance and features power-law asymptotics with tail exponent equal to α, i.e.,
for large x; see Property 1.2.15 in [Samorodnitsky and Taqqu, 1994] . Note that smaller values of α correspond to heavier tails and, thus, higher probabilities of extreme events. Henceforth, we focus on demands with stability parameter α > 1, so that their expectations are finite, and the corresponding expected profits well-defined. The location parameter µ is equivalent to the mean of the distribution if α > 1. The scale parameter σ is equivalent to the standard deviation of the distribution whenever this is finite, i.e., in the case of normal distributions. Finally, the skewness parameter β determines how skewed is the distribution and to which direction; if β = 0 then the corresponding density is symmetric around µ; Property 1.2.5 in [Samorodnitsky and Taqqu, 1994] .
Let us first prove the result in the case where D ∼ S α (σ, 0, µ). The convolution-invariance of stable distributions implies that
Corollary 1.2.9 in [Samorodnitsky and Taqqu, 1994] . Combined with Eqs. (10) and (11), we therefore wish to show that
At this point, we distinguish between three cases.
Case (i):Q ≥ µ. Eq. (16) implies thatQ ≥Q, so it suffices to show that
which is clearly true;
Case (ii):Q ≤ µ/2. It is known that the probability density function of a stably distributed random variable is unimodal, centered around µ in the symmetric case, which implies that the corresponding probability distribution function F (·) = P(D ≤ ·) is convex in [0, µ] . Thus, in the case whereQ ≤ µ/2, so that 2Q ≤ µ, we have that
We recall our standing assumption regarding the parameters of the demand distribution being such A4 that F (0) = 0, in order for the model to have practical relevance. Hence,
which is exactly the requirement of Eq. (15); Case (iii): µ/2 ≤Q ≤ µ. First, we show thatQ ≥ 0. Equivalently
which is true for all α ∈ (1, 2] andQ ∈ [µ/2, µ]. On the other hand, Eq. (16) implies thatQ ≤ µ.
Our proof strategy is to establish that x ≤ µ, and sinceQ ≤ µ, to use a similar argument as in the proof of Case (ii). In particular,
which implies that x is monotonically increasing inQ. Consequently,
Then, the convexity of F (·) in [0, µ] implies that
which is exactly the requirement of Eq. (15).
To complete the proof, we need to consider the case where the demands are uniformly distributed. We defer the proof of this case for later, after we present the proof of Proposition 4(a).
Proofs of Propositions 1(b)-1(c)
We decompose the proofs of Propositions 1(b)-1(c) into a sequence of lemmas, so as to streamline their presentation. 
(iii) µ/2 <Q < µ and ρ ≥ −1/2.
Proof. The proof of this Lemma follows a similar strategy to the proof of Proposition 1(a), with the main difference being that it takes into account the impact of demand correlation, by leveraging properties of the Normal distribution.
, and the correlation coefficient between the demands is ρ, we have that
It is straightforward to verify that
because the Normal distribution is completely defined by its mean and variance. Hence, according to Eqs. (10) and (11), we wish to show that
In terms of the primitives of our problem, this condition is equivalent to p − c ≥ c, i.e., the profit margin is at least as large as the marginal capacity cost (for non-flexible resources). Note thatQ
which holds for everyQ ≥ µ. Thus, Eq. (17) holds in this case;
Case (ii):Q ≤ µ/2. It is known that the probability distribution function
Normal random variable is convex in [0, µ] . Thus, in the case whereQ ≤ µ/2, so that 2Q ≤ µ, we A6 have that
We recall our standing assumption regarding the parameters of the demand distribution being such that F (0) = 0, in order for the model to have practical relevance. Hence,
which is exactly the requirement of Eq. (17);
Case (iii): µ/2 ≤Q ≤ µ. First, we note that
for µ/2 ≤Q ≤ µ. Furthermore, in the same region,Q(ρ) ≤Q:
which holds for everyQ ≤ µ. In summary, we have established that 0 ≤Q(ρ) ≤Q ≤ µ, assuming ρ ≥ −1/2. Now, we investigate conditions under which
The above holds for every ρ ≥ −1/2, as long asQ ≤ µ. Then, the convexity of
where in the last inequality we have used the fact thatQ ≥ µ/2. This is precisely the requirement of Eq. (17).
Lemma 5. Consider the scenario of equal capacities. Assume that the demands are independent
and Normally distributed, with means µ 1 and µ 2 = µ 1 − ∆µ, ∆µ ≤ µ 1 , respectively, and the same standard deviation σ 1 = σ 2 = σ. Also, assume that the products/services have the same margin,
i.e., p 1 = p 2 = p. Then, the expected learning in the flexible system is higher than in the non-flexible one, i.e., L F ≥ L N , in the following cases:
(ii)Q 1 < µ 1 and ∆µ ≤ ∆µ, for some ∆µ ≥ 0.
Proof. We assume that the demands are independent, with D 1
Moreover, it can be verified that
On the other hand, Lemma 1 implies that
Since the demands are Normally distributed, there exists k such thatQ 1 = µ 1 + kσ andQ 2 = µ 1 − ∆µ + kσ, so thatQ 2 =Q 1 − ∆µ. Combining the above with Eqs. (10) and (11), we wish to
show that
At this point, we distinguish between two cases.
which always holds forQ 1 ≥ µ 1 , since µ 2 = µ 1 − ∆µ ≥ 0. Hence,
which always hold forQ 1 ≥ µ 1 . Consequently,
The two inequalities directly imply Eq. (18); Case (ii):Q 1 < µ 1 . For convenience let us define the function
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Note that only the left-most term depends on ∆µ, and since D 1 is a continuous random variable with an atomless density, g(·) is continuous and monotonically decreasing in ∆µ. Moreover, a more refined line of reasoning in the proof of Proposition 1(a) implies that g(0) > 0 wheneverQ 1 < µ, since the probability distribution function of N µ, σ 2 is, actually, strictly convex in [0, µ] . Finally, it can also be verified that g ∆µ < 0, for all ∆µ ∈ Q 1 , µ 1 . Then, the continuity of function g(·)
implies the existence of ∆µ ∈ 0,Q 1 such that g ∆µ = 0.
In summary, there exists ∆µ > 0 such that Eq. (18) holds, for all ∆µ ≤ ∆µ.
Lemma 6. Consider the scenario of equal capacities. Assume that the demands are independent
and Normally distributed, with the same mean µ 1 = µ 2 = µ, and standard deviations σ 1 = σ and σ 2 = λσ, λ ≥ 0, respectively. Also, assume that the products/services have the same margin, i.e.,
Then, the expected learning in the flexible system is higher than in the non-flexible
(ii)Q 1 < µ and λ ≤λ, for someλ > 1.
Proof. We assume that the demands are independent, with
Since the demands are Normally distributed, there exists k such thatQ 1 = µ+kσ andQ 2 = µ+kλσ, for some k ∈ R. Combining the above with Eqs. (10) and (11), we wish to show that
which holds for every λ ≥ 0. The two inequalities directly imply Eq. (19);
Case (ii):Q 1 < µ ⇐⇒ k < 0. For convenience let us define the function
Since D 1 is a continuous random variable with an atomless density, g(·) is continuous. Moreover, note that
where f (·) is the probability density function of N µ, σ 2 . In the case where
is monotonically decreasing in λ (since k < 0). On the other hand, a more refined line of reasoning in the proof of Proposition 1(a) implies that g(1) > 0 wheneverQ 1 < µ, since the probability distribution function of N µ, σ 2 is, actually, strictly convex in [0, µ] .
Hence, there existsλ > 1 such that Eq. (19) holds, for all λ ∈ 0,λ . Proof. We assume that the demands are independent, with
Combining the above with Eqs. (10) and (11), we wish to show that
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Now, Lemma 1 implies that
Let α = (p 1 −c)/p 1 , and λ such that λα = (p 2 −c)/p 2 . Since the demands are Normally distributed,
Hence, we wish to show that
where F (·) is the cumulative distribution function of the Normal random variable with mean µ and standard deviation σ,
and
Note that
since this is equivalent to
We proceed by distinguishing between two cases.
, at least one of the two products/services has a high margin (relative to its price). Note that Case (ii-a):
Combined with our standing assumption regarding the parameters of the demand distribution being such that F (0) = 0, we have that F Q 1 + F Q 2 ≤ F (x 1 ), which implies that Eq. (20) holds in this case;
Case (ii-b): x 1 > µ and λ > 1. Here, we have that
Moreover, we note that
Hence,
so Eq. (20) holds in this case;
Case (ii-c): x 1 > µ and λ ≤ 1. The proof of the result in this case follows exactly the same line of reasoning as in Case (ii-b). We omit this proof for brevity.
Proof of Proposition 2
In the scenario of equal costs, the firm chooses the capacity of the system so as to maximize its expected profit, both in the non-flexible and the flexible case. The critical assumption here is that the marginal cost of flexible capacity is the same as that of non-flexible capacity, i.e., c F = c.
Let us first prove an intermediate lemma, which we use later in establishing the main result: in the equal-costs scenario, we have thatQ
Note that function
is monotonically nondecreasing in x. Lemma 2 implies that g Q F = p 1 − c. On the other hand,
where in the second-to-last equality we also use Lemma 1. Therefore, g Q 1 ≤ g Q F , which implies Eq. (22) due to the monotonicity of function g(·).
Let us now come to the proof of the main result. According to Eqs. (10) and (11), we wish to
Taking into account Lemmas 1 and 2 (the latter with c F = c), it is equivalent to show that
Using Eq. (22), it suffices to show that
which always holds.
Proof of Proposition 3(a)
Let D i be uniformly distributed on [x, x + U ], where x, U ≥ 0.
Using Lemma 3, we get that the non-flexible system's optimal expected profit is given by
Similarly, using the expression for the optimal capacityQ, the non-flexible system's expected learning is given by
We now deal with the flexible system. Because p 1 = p 2 , the flexible system essentially operates as a newsvendor facing demand equal to the total demand for both products, D 1 + D 2 . This is equal in distribution to 2x + Z, where Z has a density
Thus,Q F = 2x + K F , where K F is the optimal capacity for a newsvendor facing demand Z. We distinguish two cases, depending on the value of
The optimality condition (8) forQ F yields
Similarly, the flexible system's expected learning in this case is given by
Putting together conditions that the parameters have to satisfy, we obtain the following set that the problem parameters need to lie in:
The first constraint above corresponds to (9); the second to the optimality condition forQ F ; the third to our assumption about K F . We will show that
. This is essentially equivalent to showing that (p, c, x, U, c F 
Similarly, the optimality condition yields
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and the flexible system's expected learning in this case is given by
A corresponding set that the problem parameters need to lie in for this case is:
To complete the proof, it suffices to show that
This claim can again be confirmed using polynomial optimization methods.
Proof of Proposition 3(b)
Part (i) To ease exposition, we assume without loss that D 1 is uniformly distributed on µ − . Using Lemma 3, we get that the non-flexible system's optimal expected profit is given by
Arguing is a similar fashion as in the proof of Proposition 3(a), the optimal capacity for the flexible system isQ F = 2µ + δµ − 1 + K F , where K F is the optimal capacity for a newsvendor facing demand Z, where Z is distributed as in Proposition 3(a) with U = 1. We distinguish again between two cases, depending on the value of
Thus, we obtain the following set that the problem parameters need to lie in:
Using SOS methods, it can be readily checked that
For K F ∈ [0, 1), one can use similar steps, which we omit for brevity.
We will first deal with the case whereby σ 1 ≤ σ 2 , that is x ≥ 1 2 . Using Lemma 3, we get that the non-flexible system's optimal expected profit is given by
Arguing as above, the optimal capacity for the flexible system isQ F = 2µ
K F is the optimal capacity for a newsvendor facing demand Z, where Z has density
The expected profits of the flexible system can be expressed as
Similarly, the optimality condition that K F needs to satisfy can be expressed as The flexible system's expected learning in this case is given by
. Therefore, if we limit our attention to one of the following four intervals that K F could belong
, we obtain the following respective sets that the problem parameters need to lie in, each of which involves constraints that are polynomial functions of the underlying parameters:
Using SOS methods, it can be readily checked that L F ≥ L N for all (p, c, µ, x, c F , K F ) ∈ A j for j = 1, 2, 3. For j = 4, however, it can be checked that there exist (p, c, µ, x, c F 
For the case of σ 1 ≤ σ 2 , that is x < 1 2 , one can show that under no circumstances L F < L N could hold using similar steps, which we omit for brevity.
Part (iii)
To ease exposition, suppose that
The non-flexible system's expected learning is given by
The optimality condition for the capacity of the flexible system,Q F , in Lemma 2 can be simplified by writingQ
where V is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and Z is distributed as in Proposition 3(a) with U = 1.
We distinguish two cases. First, suppose that µ − 1 2 + K F ≥ 1. Then, the optimality condition reduces to
which can be readily expressed as polynomial functions of all underlying parameters by distinguishing the subcases of K F being greater or smaller than 1. For the expected profit, note that all of demand D 1 is satisfied almost surely, that is S F,1 = D 1 . For D 2 , we then get that
Therefore, we get that
which can again be readily expressed as polynomial functions of all underlying parameters by distinguishing the subcases of K F being greater or smaller than 1. The following set then represents the feasible set the problem parameters need to lie in, each of which involves constraints that are polynomial functions of the underlying parameters: However, by adding the additional constraint p 1 ≤ 3p 2 and using SOS methods, it can be checked that L F ≥ L N for all points in both A 1 and A 2 .
For the case of µ − 1 2 + K F < 1, the analysis follows similar steps, which we omit for brevity.
Proof of Proposition 3(c)
Recall from the proof of Part (ii) of Proposition 3(b), that L F ≥ L N , unless σ 2 ≥ σ 1 and K F ∈ I 4 .
By adding the constraint p − c ≥ c in set A 4 , this case can also be ruled out, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4
To ease exposition, we assume without loss that D 1 and D 2 are uniformly distributed on [x, x + 1]
for some x ≥ 0.
Using Lemma 3, we get that the non-flexible system's optimal objective, which we denote with for 0 ≤ γ < c. (For γ ≥ c the stock-out probability is zero and Proposition 4 does not apply)
For the flexible system, we first claim that, for any value ofQ F and parameter γ we consider here, it is optimal to make all capacity available to serve product 1 first, as opposed to reserving any capacity for product 2. The proof of this claim involves straightforward algebra and is omitted for brevity; it simply involves expressing the expected sales given some value of reserved capacity, and then showing that the derivative of the objective with respect to this reserved capacity is always non-positive.
For the objective for the flexible system, let π F (c F ) be the expected profits and L F be the expected learning. Then, to express the objective for the flexible system, denoted with o F (γ, c F ) = π F (c F ) + γL F , we can use the expressions for the expected profits from Proposition 3(a). Thus, it will be convenient to express the flexible's system capacity as Q F = 2x + K F , for some K F ∈ [0, 2], and distinguish between the cases of K F ∈ [0, 1) or K F ∈ [1, 2]. For the expected learning, it can A20 be verified that
To derive conditions for the optimal flexible capacity level, we first make the following claims
is non-negative for K F → 1 − , then so it is for all K F < 1.
• Claim 2:
• Claim 3: If
is non-positive for all K F ≥ 1.
• Claim 4: If
is negative for K F → 1 + , then it is non-positive for all K F ≥ 1.
Proving these claims again relies on straightforward algebra. Using these claims, we conclude that there are three cases of interest for the optimal flexible capacity levelK F :
• Case 1: if p + 2γ − 2c F ≥ 0, thenK F ≥ 1 and also satisfies
• Case 2: if p + 2γ − 2c F < 0 and p + 4γ − 2c F ≥ 0, thenK F = 1.
• Case 3: if p + 4γ − 2c F < 0, thenK F < 1 and also satisfies
Note that under each of these three cases, the associated optimality condition forK F can be readily expressed as a polynomial function of underlying parameters.
We consider two problems: one for which learning is not accounted for in the objective (γ = 0), and one for which it is (γ ≥ 0). Let K F,0 and K F,γ be the flexible system's capacity under the two problems.
Next, we focus on each part of the Proposition separately. In each part, we consider all the different cases that could arise depending on which of the three cases we elicited above for the optimal flexible capacity K F,0 and K F,γ satisfy.
(a) For brevity, we present here only the case where both satisfy Case 1, that is we have p − 2c ≥ 0 and p + 2γ − 2c ≥ 0. The proof for all other cases is similar and is omitted.
We can write the set that all problem parameters need to lie in as follows: 
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The first three pairs of constraints capture the optimality conditions for the flexible capacities.
Note that all constraints are polynomial functions of the underlying parameters. To complete the proof, it can be checked using polynomial optimization methods that
which itself involves only polynomials, holds true for all parameters in A.
(b) For brevity, we present here only the case where both satisfy Case 1, that is we have p−2c F (0) ≥ 0 and p + 2γ − 2c F (γ) ≥ 0. The proof for all other cases is similar and is omitted.
We can write the set that all problem parameters need to lie in as follows:
The first pair of constraints ensure that the non-flexible and the flexible systems achieve the same objective value; the second, third and fourth pairs capture the optimality conditions for the flexible capacities. Note that all constraints are polynomial functions of the underlying parameters. To complete the proof, it can be checked using polynomial optimization methods that c F,γ ≥ c F,0 holds true for all parameters in B.
Proof of Proposition 1(a) for uniformly distributed demands
Assume without loss that D 1 and D 2 are uniformly distributed on [x, x + 1] for some x ≥ 0. Using our analysis from the proof of Proposition 4, we get that
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where K F = 2 p−c p in this case. By substituting, we get that
